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Remarks on macroprudential policy frameworks 
David Longworth
1 
I would like to thank the organisers of this conference for inviting me to participate in this 
panel. It is obvious from this conference that central banks continue to be the leaders in the 
development and discussion of macroprudential regulation and policy.  
“Every financial crisis is the same.” 
“Every financial crisis is different.” 
Both are “true” in their own way. As Kindleberger wrote in his famous book on financial 
crises, “For historians each event is unique. In contrast economists maintain that there are 
patterns in the data and particular events are likely to induce similar responses.”
2 
Policymakers should focus mostly on what is “the same,” as Tim Ng argued this morning.
3 
Like historians, however, they cannot neglect what is unique because (i) our economic 
theories may not capture all that is relevant and (ii) the details may – if examined in the light 
of the aggregates – help us to understand what is going on. 
I want to argue today that the need to be aware both of the similarities and differences in 
financial cycles and crises has implications for macroprudential policy. 
In particular, it has implications for: 
  The framework for macroprudential policy; 
  The governance of macroprudential policy; 
  Cross-cutting policy issues which are of relevance to macroprudential policy, 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and consumer protection. I will illustrate this final point 
by a look at the area of housing and housing finance. 
I will begin with implications for the framework of macroprudential policy. I like to think of the 
heart of this framework as being illustrated in the following diagram (Figure 1). 
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The legislature grants certain powers to a macroprudential authority, which may be a 
committee, a standalone agency or a central bank. These powers allow the authority to 
undertake certain activities and to use certain policy instruments to attain certain goals. 
Attaining these goals will help it to achieve an objective such as having a low probability of 
financial disruptions in the economy. 
Today, I would like to focus on the elements of the framework having to do with activities and 
policy instruments. The key activities for a macroprudential authority are data collection, 
surveillance of the financial sector, analysis, stress-testing of the sector and risk assessment. 
Based on those activities – particularly risk assessment – and given its goals, the 
macroprudential authority uses the policy instruments at its disposal. These will typically take 
the form of macroprudential instruments, advice on policies to individual regulators or to the 
government, and warnings to regulators or financial system participants. Of course, the 
macroprudential instruments may not be under the direct control of the macroprudential 
authority, but it may have the power to direct their use by others or to issue “comply or 
explain” orders. 
Because of the sameness of financial cycles and financial crises, there must be an essential 
element of data collection that focuses on important credit aggregates, important asset 
prices, important interconnections between financial institutions and common exposures of 
financial institutions – especially exposures that are growing rapidly. An important element of 
surveillance, analysis, and risk assessment must also focus on these. Benchmarks for 
countercyclical macroprudential tools will typically be derived from historical studies of the 
behaviour of credit aggregates and important asset prices. 
Because of the uniqueness of financial crises, however, there will be another important 
element of data collection that focuses on what is happening because of financial innovation 
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procedures to track. Again, an important element of surveillance and risk assessment must 
also focus on these. As well, the judgement in setting macroprudential instruments will come 
from surveying, analysing and assessing – very carefully! – what is different this time. Policy 
advice and warnings may also come from tracking what is new and unregulated. 
I would now like to turn to the governance of macroprudential policy. 
Three important elements of governance (Figure 2) are the following: 
  Legislating which committee or organisation will be the responsible macroprudential 
authority; 
  The relationships (both legal and informal) between the macroprudential authority 
and other domestic regulators, and between the macroprudential authority and 
international bodies, including, importantly, international standard setters; 
  The legitimacy of the macroprudential authority, which stems from its accountability, 
communication, staff quality and overall reputation – and is essential to the 
maintenance of any independence that it has been granted. 
Figure 2 
 
I believe that, because every financial crisis differs in some respects from previous crises, 
committees can be especially valuable in macroprudential governance. 
Canada has not yet announced its macroprudential governance regime. It has had, however, a 
reasonably good experience with federal inter-agency committees over the past 15–20 years 
or so. Let me explain.  
There is a Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee, chaired by the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (who is the supervisor of banks, insurance companies and pension 
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Minister of Finance, the Chair of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
Commissioner of the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. It meets at least quarterly to 
give advice to the Superintendent (who is not required to take it), and to coordinate policy 
actions when necessary. During some stages of the recent crisis, it was meeting almost 
daily. Because the senior members of the agencies are almost always present, they get to 
know each other well. This is very important in normal times, so it is easier to communicate 
when a crisis comes. 
There is also a Senior Advisory Committee (on financial regulation), chaired by the Deputy 
Minister of Finance, which consists of the same members and gives advice to the 
Department of Finance on financial regulation and legislation. 
Alan Blinder’s work with John Morgan on committees and governance,
4 which focused on 
monetary policy committees, also suggests the value of committees: “Group decisions are on 
average better than individual decisions.”
5 
Macroprudential policy touches deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies, broker-
dealers, markets and market infrastructure. Given this diverse nature, cross-institutional 
committees should enhance legitimacy, as long as it is clear who is responsible and – most 
importantly – the committee keeps a true macroprudential orientation. It is also true that 
cross-institutional committees in large and medium-sized countries will, through their 
members, have appropriate international contacts at the G20, FSB, the BIS, the BCBS, and 
IOSCO. 
I would now like to move to the third element of my presentation: cross-cutting policy issues, 
which I will illustrate by the area of housing and housing finance.  
Housing finance and its regulation differ greatly across countries. As in the most recent crisis, 
many crises have been associated with bubbles in house prices and mortgage credit. There 
are at least three areas (Figure 3) where house prices and housing finance are important in 
thinking about the prevention of future financial crises: 
  There are macroprudential tools, such as the use of maximum loan-to-value ratios; 
  There is government involvement in the mortgage finance area, through insuring 
mortgages or securitised products, perhaps through a government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE); 
  There is the question of which inflation measure should be targeted or monitored by 
monetary policy and whether housing prices are included in that measure.  
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Given the “sameness” of crises, and given that the last crisis was closely related to mortgage 
finance that fed a housing price bubble in more than one country, it is somewhat 
disconcerting that most countries have not yet dealt with one or more of the following: 
  The formal development of macroprudential tools associated with mortgage credit 
and housing prices (including countercyclical ones). More examination is necessary 
of the relative roles, for example, of loan-to-value ratios and debt-service-to-income 
ratios. 
  The re-examination of the overall governance of GSEs, state-owned enterprises, 
and government insurers in the mortgage area, including how the terms and 
conditions that they set for insurance affect the behaviour of the mortgage and 
housing price cycle. These terms and conditions need to be examined at the same 
time as macroprudential tools in this area.
6 
  The re-examination of how housing prices should be incorporated in the overall 
inflation index targeted or monitored by the central bank. I would note that the 
Canadian CPI contains a few housing-related components that move closely with 
Statistics Canada’s New House Price Index. This has been very helpful to Canadian 
monetary policy. Dropping housing from the targeted index in the United Kingdom in 
the move from the RPI to the harmonised index seems to have been distinctly 
unhelpful. 
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Much is left to do from a policy point of view in the housing and housing finance area. 
It is time to conclude. 
Macroprudential policy should marry the best macro perspective with the use and significant 
tweaking of traditional microprudential policy instruments. The wedding gown at the marriage 
should have the traditional “something old, something new, something borrowed, something 
blue”. The “something old” represents the focus on the things that are the same in financial 
cycles and financial crises. The “something new” represents the focus on innovations – new 
products, new products, new procedures. The “something borrowed” in many countries will 
be governance by committee, which should bring strength through diversity. At the moment, 
the “something blue” is that much more progress is needed on policy issues related to 
mortgage credit and housing prices. Those central banks that play an advisory role to their 
treasuries should not hesitate to speak up with good policy advice in this cross-cutting area. 
This will lead to a “blue sky” for the wedding day. 